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Introduction
Both positive and adverse economic shocks often necessitate a change in the allocation of capital and labor between industries (cfr. Blanchard et al. 2014) . Over the recent Great Recession, large structural shifts were observed in both the US (e.g. Elsby et al. 2010, Herkenho and Ohanian 2011) and the European economies (e.g. Burda et al. 2011 , Van Dalen and Henkens 2013 , Anghel et al. 2014 , Hogrefe and Sachs 2014 . Sectoral reallocation can play a considerable part in reinforcing the recessionary pressure, as argued by Aaronson et al. (2004) , Herkenho and Ohanian (2011) and Amable and Mayhew (2011) amongst others. As emphasized by Hogrefe and Sachs (2014) , labor reallocation in both advanced and emerging economies intensied recently. The question arises whether these reallocations should happen with laissez-faire churning. Perhaps without a policy intervention churning becomes excessive, bringing about productivity and welfare losses in the course of adjustment.
Theoretical foundations to this question have been developed in models envisioning a ow of workers from a shrinking to an expanding sector. In the context of economic transition, the theoretical underpinnings to this debate were provided by Aghion and Blanchard (1994) who operationalized the concept of the optimal speed of transition. With further renements, these models try to capture the process of a decline in the inecient sector and the emergence of a new sector, with workers forced to relocate from jobs in the old sector to those in the new emerging rms.
1 In the context of a sectoral change, a similar approach was proposed in a series of theoretical contributions by Caballero and Hammour (1996a , 1996b , 1998 , 2000 , who conceptualize reallocation as a ow of workers between industries. Following these two conceptualizations, faster and synchronized labor reallocation should be conducive to labor productivity with a potential welfare trade o associated with temporary increase in income inequality due to churning.
Moreover, de-synchronized, i.e. excessively fast, job destruction rates can reinforce the upward pressure on income inequality, but should have little or no eect on labor productivity growth.
After nearly three decades since the onset of economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the experience from CEE countries can provide useful insights into the empirical validity of the theoretical predictions. With a varied performance across the transition economies, country level studies can at best demonstrate the consequences of particular policy choices, but they cannot provide a general overview of the link between the speed of workers' reallocation and economic performance (see Fidrmuc 2003 , Aristei and Perugini 2012 , Peev and Mueller 2012 , Amin and Djankov 2014 . In analyzing the worker ows in transition economies one encounters a methodological challenge of how one ought to capture the best policy measure associated with worker ows. Godoy and Stiglitz (2006) rely on a measure used widely in the literature, namely the level and speed of privatization. Yet the government's ability to privatize at a certain moment depends crucially on the contemporaneous economic performance, reinforcing the obvious link between business cycles and worker ows. Moreover, ows become dependent upon initial conditions (see BenYishay and Grosjean 2014) . In addition, privatization may mean both job ows (with new private owners preserving employment level in former state-owned enterprise) 1 Naturally, there is also a second strand of the theoretical literature, which focuses on the political economy aspects of shock therapy, see Marangos (2002) for an overview while Rovelli and Zaiceva (2013) , Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) provide recent extensions. and worker ows (with new private owners reducing jobs in a formerly state-owned enterprise).
Privatization indicators may also overlook signicant ows (e.g. a state-owned enterprise going bankrupt without being privatized with workers being forced to seek employment elsewhere).
Consequently, analyses using privatization as a measure of labor market reallocation cannot satisfactorily capture the workers and jobs ows a channel of key policy interest.
Attractive alternatives to the speed and level of privatization would be indicators of worker ows. However, most transition countries were not collecting data on gross worker ows. Data on net worker ows have been collected in national labor force surveys of most transition economies from mid-to-late 1990s, but these indicators usually calculated as a change over time in the level of employment by sector and/or ownership category are contaminated by job-to-job ows within sectors and ownership categories, as well as ows from and into non-employment. Finally, in analysis of this type, it would be desirable to compare worker ows with job creation and job destruction. These indicators are also aected by the discrepancies between gross and net measures it is possible that in a given time period an enterprise or sector experienced no or negligible net ows while having substantial gross ows.
These data requirements and limited availability of data have aected the literature. First, most studies cover one or at the most few countries. Second, they often rely on dedicated data sets (such as incidental surveys), which limits the number of years for which analyses could be performed. Third, because dierent authors used data from dierent sources on dierent countries in dierent periods, they are rarely directly comparable. Finally, authors have addressed the research question with dierent methodologies and variables (e.g., job ows vs. worker ows, net measures vs. gross indicators and dierent model specications). Thus, synthesizing the results is not a simple task.
Our objective is to contribute to the literature using the tools from a meta-analysis. Exploiting the results from a wide variety of studies, we address the question of whether a larger scope of worker reallocation is associated with higher rate of productivity growth and higher (disposable) income inequality. While the academic and policy relevance of this question is obvious, providing an answer would not be feasible if one were to rely on data from only one or a few countries. A meta-analysis allows researchers to partially overcome the constraints imposed by data availability. We also test the validity of these results using a comprehensive recent dataset on worker ows in CEE countries during the period of economic transition.
Given its diversity, the evidence from the economic transition in CEE is of a wider appeal for at least two reasons. First, it provides a large quasi-experiment, with a set of countries pursuing unique policy mix at dierentiated rates. The evidence gathered in these case and cross-sectional studies can constitute a relatively general guidance for other countries experiencing large scale labor reallocation. 2 Second, given the time elapsed since the beginning of the transition, the long-term eects can already be observed.
We nd that the link between job ows and productivity is weak, mostly contemporaneous, and that it occurs mainly through job creation/hiring. On the other hand, we show that the link between job ows and inequality is strong and robust. In the short run, higher job ows tend to be associated with increasing income inequality. In the long run, the eects come mostly 2 Conceptually, the links have already been made to China (Sachs et al. 1994 , Buck et al. 2001 , India (Sachs 1995 , Sen 1998 and Iraq (Looney 2004) .
3 from job creation/hiring. These ndings suggest that it is the lack of synchronization between job creation and job destruction that contributes to less equal economic outcomes. However, the fact that the strong correlation is between inequality and job creation/hiring suggests that it is wage dispersion in the newly created jobs rather than insucient social safety nets that drives income inequality. Overall, the links postulated by the theory do not nd much support in the data. In addition, they seem to have been mitigated by a number of factors unaccounted for in the literature. One important factor may be the scale and scope of job destruction/separation in the emerging sectors as opposed to the decaying ones.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the theoretical link between the speed of labor reallocation during the transition and the productivity dynamics. In Section 3 we describe the procedure of collecting the data for this quantitative analysis of the literature. Section 4 provides an overview of the ndings in the literature, elaborating on the cross-country dierences as well as time trends. Finally, in Section 5 we employ the meta-analysis tools to quantify the strength of the link between the productivity and the speed of labor reallocation. In this section we also provide the cross-validation with the alternative sources of data. The concluding section summarizes the policy implications of our study.
Theoretical insights
There are two perspectives on labor reallocation: job ows and worker ows. Job ows are obtained from rm-level data and represent the change in the number of employees within a period of time. Worker ows correspond to the movement of workers in and out of the companies as well as in and out of the labor market. 3 In an extreme case, if all workers swapped rms, net and gross job ows would be equal to zero, net worker ows would be equal to zero and gross worker ows would be twice the number of workers. Job destruction in the decaying sector as well as the job creation in the emerging sector can occur in three dierent forms: ownership change (e.g. privatization), shut-down or a combination of the two. With pure ownership change, workers stay in the rm, i.e. job destruction and creation occurs with no worker ows. However, if a company exits the market and a new sector emerges as is posited by theories of the optimal speed of transition workers ow between jobs in dierent companies, possibly with a spell of unemployment between the two jobs. Redundancies in the presence of ownership change come from the new owner reducing employment, thus causing job destructions and forcing worker ows in both gross and net terms.
The distinction between job and worker ows is not only important conceptually but also empirically. Analyzing gross worker ows typically requires individual-level data, such as those collected in labor force surveys whereas gross job ows can only be studied with rm-level databases. To analyze net ows for both workers and jobs it is sucient to rely on more readily available aggregate statistics, such as the overall change in sectoral employment or rm-level change in headcount, within a given time period such as one year. Given the well documented lack of reliable information at the level of individuals or detailed employment statistics for rms, 3 In the reminder of this paper, we refer to job ows for job creation and destruction, and to worker ows for hirings and separations. 4 a large part of the literature has focused on net worker ows or net job ows, see Davis and Haltiwanger (1996) . This has important consequences for building a link between theoretical models and empirical analyses. Specically, the former typically impose two stylized features: rms only adjust one way (i.e. gross and net ows are equivalent) and model mechanics focus on gross worker ows.
The inuential model of Aghion and Blanchard (1994) , which provides an intuitive mechanism relating labor reallocation to productivity, is no exception from this rule. An economy has two sectors: incumbent inecient public sector and private newcomers with an exogenous eciency advantage. With a government interested in maximizing output, privatization and making room for the private sector is the only strategy, but the focus of the model lies in the speed at which it is optimal to pursue privatization. By destroying jobs in the public sector, the state makes the workers available for hire in the private sector. Shrinking the size of the state sector has two opposing eects. First, redundant workers seeking a new job generate downward wage pressure, facilitating job creation in the private sector. Second, with a growing pool of unemployed workers, the need for social nets emerges, funded by taxing labor and thus creating a wedge between the net wage and cost of employment. Consequently, excessive job destruction may actually diminish job creation. Depending on the synchronization between a downward pressure on wage expectations of the job seekers and an upward pressure on non-wage employment costs, the economy can pursue transition on a balanced path of fairly low unemployment or enter an unstable equilibrium with unemployment uctuating at relatively high levels 4
The Aghion and Blanchard (1994) framework with its subsequent extensions 5 , provides insights into the possible link between worker reallocation and economic eciency. On the one hand, excessive reallocation implies unstable equilibria with high unemployment, thus lowering social cohesion and increasing inequality -both in terms of level and in relative terms to the pre-transition situation. On the other hand, higher unemployment may be consistent with the selection into employment of only more productive individuals as well as faster adjustment from misallocation to optimal allocation of both capital and labor. Consequently, a larger scope of worker reallocation more churning would be associated with higher productivity growth. However, any job destruction even if synchronized with job creation rates could imply that due to imperfect information and lengthy churning many productive workers take longer to secure a lasting adequate match after a change in the economy structure. Thus, higher speed of transition could also be associated with a lower productivity growth, since a long matching process represents an eciency loss, i.e. it lowers the relation between the actual and potential productivity level and thus growth. While the transition economies experienced job and worker ows through privatizations and bankruptcy/redundancies in varying proportions their eects on productivity and inequality are bound to dier. Pure privatization should imply a positive eect on productivity with no paramount eect on inequality in the short run (i.e. until new 4 The objective of the government was not relevant for the empirical literature and thus we do not focus on it. The key feature of the Aghion and Blanchard (1994) model that attracted research attention was the synchronization between the job destruction and job creation and the consequences of the de-synchronization in terms of unemployment and wages. 5 The extensions encompass various aspects of the reallocation process. Boeri (2000) , Balla et al. (2008) introduced heterogeneity among workers, Papapanagos and Sanfey (2003) introduced the possibility of migration, Tichit (2006) accounted for inactivity and Bruno (2006) allowed for job destruction in the private sector. wage structure emerges). Firm shut-downs and mergers generate worker ows, thus necessitating the channels such as de-synchronization and unstable equilibria, misallocation as well as possibly lengthy churning see Beauchemin and Tasci (2014) as well as Mukoyama (2014) for a recent theoretical treatment.
Summarizing, the optimal speed of transition theory provides some grounds to expect a positive link between job destruction, or excess job destruction, and income inequality, but the models have little predictive power for job creation as well as net/gross worker ows. In terms of a link to productivity, both positive and negative correlations are possible on theoretical grounds, the coecients should be larger for job destruction and creation than for hirings and separations. Moreover, these eects can be lasting such as eciency loss due to lengthy churning or misallocation but need not be. It is the objective of this paper to put these theoretical predictions to empirical test. We collect the estimates on job and worker ows from the literature and complement them with worker ows data obtained from Living in Transition Survey by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. We test explicitly the contemporaneous and long-term links between labor market ows and labor productivity as well as income inequality 3 Sampling of studies
We obtained the list of articles for our quantitative analysis from EconLit. 6 In the initial sample we included all published articles and book chapters in English appearing under the key words: reallocation and transition. From this list we excluded studies that were purely theoretical or relied only on simulations.
The search generated 131 papers, of which 16 were not in English and 19 were theoretical or simulation exercises. We reviewed each of the remaining 96 papers and eliminated 67 papers that were unrelated to labor reallocation (e.g. those dealing with nancial ows and land property changes).To limit the risk that a relevant paper remains unaccounted for, we carefully explored the references list of the relevant studies. This additional search increased the number of papers by 5.
An inspection of the relevant papers indicated that they vary in terms of model specication, data and variables as well as statistics reported. Given the focus of our research, we used papers that contained conceptually comparable estimates of labor market ows for the transition economies. Thus, our quantitative analysis includes all studies which reported usable 7 estimates of job ows (whether job creation and destruction or hirings and separations) for the transition 6 See Stanley and Jarrell (2005) for the comparison of validity between EconLit and GoogleScholar as well as other sources. Given that the literature we analyze dates mostly to the 1990s and 2000s, our focus on published papers does not seem to impose an excessively binding constraint on the selection of papers. 7 Jurajda and Terrell (2003) include a graphical analysis of ows in Czech Republic and Estonia, but not the numerical results. We also could not use all the estimates from Walsh (2003) as in some cases, the author reports only the sum of job creation and job destruction, making the estimates of the underlying ows undecipherable. Turunen (2004) includes a transition matrix, but not the number of individuals initially in each state. Schaner (2011) provides comparison between East and West Germany aggregated over time. Earle (2012) presents both limitations: the transition matrix does not allow to recover the size of the ows and the ows are calculated over periods longer than one year. 6 economies of Central and Eastern Europe. 8 Within the sample of articles on transition economies, we could not include papers which do not report suitable information. In total, 18 articles comprised the relevant indicators for the CEE countries during the economic transition (see Table 1 ). Note: pirm indites the dt ome from ntionl registry of (rmsF pEhedited indites dt on (rms olleted y the reserherF emdeus indites dt tht ome from the fureu vn hijk dtseF sn le eFI in the online ppendixD the numer of estimtes is presented y ountry nd yerF
In total, the literature provides information on job ows in ten transition countries. These studies present many common features. First, they all use annual data. On the one hand this is suitable for the purposes of this quantitative analysis of the literature, as the reported estimates are comparable in terms of time frame. On the other hand, yearly statistics necessarily overlook ows with unemployment spells shorter than a year as well as seasonal ows see Davis and Haltiwanger (1996, for an overview of the consequences). Second, the studies refer to either rmlevel or individual-level ows, which again increases comparability, for there are no estimates of e.g. plant-level worker or job ows. Third, due to data availability constraints, most studies focus on one country, further highlighting the value of a comparative perspective.
9 Fourth, although 8 With these criteria, analyses on Danish data (Albaek and Hansen 2004) , studies of the US economy (Davis and Haltiwanger 1992 , Golan et al. 2007 , Walker 2013 , and the works on China were dropped from further analysis. While indeed China underwent signicant changes in the employment structure over the last two decades, reallocation in China is related to the urban/rural migrations and changes in the agricultural sector, which are not captured by the models in the spirit of Aghion and Blanchard (1994) , see Dong and Xu (2009). 9 The few notable exceptions comprise Faggio and Konings (2003) , where the authors compare ows for ve dierent economies and Bilsen and Konings (1998) , which studies the behavior of rms in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. Note that Jurajda and Terrell (2003) have a comparative analysis of Estonia and the Czech Republic, while Mitra et al. (2014) as well as Tyrowicz and van der Velde (2014) provide a comparative analysis, as they 7 almost half of the papers were published over just a two-year period (2002) (2003) , all papers except two focus on the rst decade of the economic transition.
Apart from commonalities, this set of publications varies on two important accounts: the measures and the data. Roughly two thirds of the papers employ rm-level data, while the remaining use worker-level data, thus reporting estimates of hirings and separations. As to the data, while all articles at worker level use national labor force surveys, the picture on rm level data is less homogeneous. Articles from this group employed mostly data gathered by national administrative bodies or statistical oces, followed by Amadeus and dedicated surveys. Also, most of the estimates come form the early transition, as much as half of them are from the 1992 to 1996 period.
Dierent data sources placed constraints on the types of ows that could be observed. Analyses based on Amadeus capture only net ows from and to large companies, as the threshold for participating in the survey excludes small rms.
10 While several articles distinguished the dynamics of job ows by rm size according to the number of employees (small, medium, large, very large), the categories overlap only partially. For example, Bojnec and Konings (1998) dene small rms are those employing less than 20 employees, for Siebertova and Senaj (2007) the threshold value is less than 50 employees whereas for Acquisti and Lehmann (2000) use a denition of less than 5 employees. A similar problems arises when sectoral composition is considered.
Many country statistical oces surveyed only rms in the manufacturing sector, which may be regarded as the heritage from the Material Production System for reporting the economic categories under central planning. Thus, even when all papers include the manufacturing sector in their estimations of job creation and destruction, only half of them include a similar measure for changes in the service sector. Finally, articles also diered on the treatment to dierent types of ownership. While 16 papers include at least one estimation for the total economy, the analysis of specic sectors is less frequent. Only nine papers provided separate analyses for the public and the private sector.
Summarizing, in total the literature reports 454 estimates of ows in 18 articles, spanning the years between 1985 and 2004 in 10 transition economies. In order to focus on reallocation due to the economic transition, we limit our analysis to estimates reported for the time periods prior to 2001, which results in the nal dataset of 430 observations. In the subsequent sections we move to an exploratory meta-analysis and an informal meta-regression to test intuitions on the link between labor market ows on the one hand and on the other: labor productivity growth as well as inequality.
Quantitative analysis of the studies
The quantitative analysis of the literature suggests that Estonia and Romania experienced the highest job creation; while the lowest estimates come from Hungary and Ukraine, followed closely employed international databases on rms and workers, respectively. However, even though both papers use measures of job creation and destruction in their analysis, the estimates are not reported and hence these papers were excluded from further analysis. 10 Depending on the country and year, the Amadeus sample might be restricted by employment or by revenue thresholds. 8 by Poland and Bulgaria. In terms of job destruction, Poland, Slovakia, and Russia were the countries with the highest estimates. ANOVA test conrms that the estimates are all statistically dierent. From Table 2 we infer that countries diered in terms of gross, net and excess reallocation as well 11 . Besides Romania and Estonia, all countries in the sample experienced negative net reallocation, which is consistent with the increase in unemployment and inactivity during the period. The largest dierence corresponds to Poland. Notes X he mens re equivlent to e'et sizes for given type of )ow nd ountry @verged over timeAF sn le eFP in the eppendix we present the verge vlues @e'et sizesA of jo retion nd destrution y ountry nd yerF All countries except Bulgaria and Estonia appear to have a similar pattern: rst, they experienced lower levels of job creation in the early 1990s converging to approximately 5%. This gure is much smaller than the 10% portrayed in the literature for mature economies in a comparable period, see Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) for the US. Estonia also converged to the 5% creation rate, but from above. For the estimates of job destruction Estonia, Bulgaria and, to some extent, Hungary and Poland experienced a surge in job destruction at the beginning of the period, and then they gradually decrease to a number between 5% and 7%, which is slightly lower than the rates observed in the US or UK, but similar to continental Western European countries (see Davis and Haltiwanger 1996) . In the Polish case, we observe a new increase in job destruction by the end of the 20th century. For Russia and Ukraine job destruction rate increased gradually throughout the entire period, whereas in the case of Slovenia it was fairly stable throughout the entire analyzed period.
To analyze synthetically the properties of the estimates for data-sources, data types, countries and periods, we conduct several regressions, exploiting the variation of the measured labor market ows in the literature, see Table 3 . It would not be accurate to call our analysis a meta-11 Gross, net and excess are three additional measures of reallocation. Gross is the sum of job creation and destruction; net is the dierence between creation and destruction, while excess is dened as gross ows minus the absolute value of net ows. 9 regression because studies typically do not report measures of precision for the estimates of labor market ows. Moreover, we lack an adequate counterpart for the true eect explored in other meta-analysis: there are no clear priors on what the value of these ows should be, especially given the country, sector and time related heterogeneity and the use of dierent ow measures -at worker and at jobs level. Given these constraints, we estimate a model with various measures of labor market ow on the LHS and characteristics of the study on the RHS. We show separately the estimates for job creation in columns (1) to (4) and job destruction in columns (5) to (8). The rst column in both sets of equations reports the average size of ows for a given subsample of estimates. In the remaining columns, we introduce controls for article, country and year. Adding these controls is meant to serve as a test on the robustness of the estimated relationships between estimate properties and its variation.
Intuitively, estimates from the rm level data tend to be much lower than those from a worker level, as revealed by the comparison between the top and the bottom panel of columns (1) and (4). Naturally, part of the dierence might be a by-product of other characteristics of the estimates; for example, ownership and industry specicity. Notably job creation appears to be lower in manufacturing than in the service sector; the pace of job destruction was remarkably even across industries. Also contrary to our initial expectations public sector was not just shrinking. Admittedly, it was much less active job creation, the values are large and positive. In terms of job destruction, the public sector was comparable to the rest of the economy. Finally, smaller rms 12 prove to be more dynamic than larger ones as they accommodated shocks by adjusting labor demand. There may also be a selection bias, as small rms are more likely to belong to the private sector.
These insights do not conform with the narrative of Aghion and Blanchard (1994) , and subsequent theoretical contributions. When it comes to creation, public, manufacturing and large rms seem to be characterized by lower estimates of the ows. Thus, theories of transition were right in pointing towards the slower job creation in the old sector but might have missed the point when portraying the emerging sector as stable. In fact, both job creation and job destruction estimates are larger when samples were restricted to small rms Summarizing, this exploratory quantitative analysis reveals three important regularities.
First, the rate of the reforms is reected in dierent paths in job creation and job destruction: countries that followed a gradualist approach are characterized by relatively stable rates for both creation and destruction, but also excess destruction seems to be fairly large. On the other hand, some of the countries that followed the so-called shock therapy are characterized with uctuating job creation and destruction rates, as well as uctuating excess destruction.
Estonia is an exception, since this country only experienced excess destruction towards the end of 1990s. Second, insights from the literature conrm only some of the theoretical predictions: large and public rms were characterized by lower job creation, whereas smaller and private rms by larger job creation. Both characteristics resemble those from advanced market economies, see Davis and Haltiwanger (1996) . Yet, important predictions of the optimal speed of transition 12 Articles did not provide a consistent criterion to distinguish between large and small rms; authors tend to employ dierent, not always overlapping, cut-o values. Nonetheless, we dene small rms as those with less than 50 employees. When the authors selected less than 100 employees as the smallest category, we consider that the estimates contained both small and large rms. Notes: everge )ows reported in olumns @IA nd @SAF everge jo retion omputed t worker level mounts to PRFSID nd VFUQ t (rm level @with t − statistic of the equlity test ETFHHAF yv estimtion in olumns @PAE@RA nd @TAE@VAF footstrpped stndrd errors with IHHH repetitions presented in prenthesesF BBBDBBDB inE dite signi(ne t the S7D IH7 nd IS7 level respetivelyF por jo destrution the respetive numers re PIFWT nd IHFPUD with t − statistic of EIIFTIF esults for gross )owsD net )ows nd exess )ows ville in le fFI in the eppendixF theory are not fully conrmed. Namely, data suggest that public and private rms had similar destruction rates. All transition economies analyzed in this survey gradually converge towards job creation and destruction rates between 5% and 7%. Plausibly, by the end of the period covered in the studies, labor market in these countries became fairly similar to advanced market economies. Given these disparities in the paths and eventual convergence, in the next section we explore the link between job ows, on the one hand, and productivity and income inequality, on the other.
The estimates from Table 3 are suggestive of one more insight: to provide a reliable analysis of the dispersion of job ows one needs to control for the characteristics of the data set. To this end, in the subsequent analyses we will use two types of indicators. First, we have the raw estimates of job ows provided in the literature. Second, we also use the residuals from the regressions portrayed in Table 3 . We calculate the residuals from the second column of each ow, which allows us to preserve country and time specic eects, while at the same time we control for dierences among the estimates.
13 These residuals convey the dispersion cleaned of the eects associated with the source of the data and the types of units covered.
The links to productivity and income inequality
Our objective in this paper is to analyze whether more churning during massive labor reallocation translates to higher productivity growth and whether it happens at the expense of higher income inequality. To this end, we present two types of evidence. First, we estimate contemporaneous correlations between alternative measures of job reallocation on the one hand and labor productivity growth and the Gini index, on the other. We refer to these measures as short-term correlations. Second, we inquire about the long-term relationship between the variables of interest. Data on labor productivity growth come from the Conference Board, whereas data on income inequality were obtained from World Income Inequality Database, see Appendix C for details.
The analysis on the estimates from the literature is complemented with data from Life in Transition Survey (henceforth, LiTS) -a recent alternative source collected by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This is a retrospective study administered in 2006 in 29 transition economies. Detailed data on employment history were collected, thus permitting computation of worker ows for a large sample of transition economies. We present the comparison between the estimates from the literature and the rates computed on data from LiTS in Appendix D.
Short-term correlations
In Table 4 , we present the short-term correlation between dierent measures of job reallocation as well as productivity growth and the Gini index, respectively. Before we discuss the actual estimates, it is worth pointing out that, theoretically, both job destruction and job creation should matter contemporaneously for the changes in productivity and inequality. Periods of recessionary pressure leading to higher job destructions are also periods of lower productivity growth. However, if rings were indicative of Schumpeterian creative destruction, productivity growth should be faster in these periods. Analogous reasoning applies to job creation. Also the relationship between job ows and inequality need not be causal. During periods of recessions, income inequality is likely to increase. 14 The opposite holds for the upturns of the business cycle.
Another important factor concerns the sample composition. As evident from Table 2 we have data on both worker and job ows for only a small number of countries. This the case of Estonia, Poland and Russia, although sometimes periods dier. In the case of Czech Republic, the literature provides only estimates for gross worker ows, whereas in the remaining six countries, 13 Unlike Table 3 the residuals come from a regression without a constant. 14 See Burkhauser et al. (1999) , Barlevy and Tsiddon (2006) , Hoover et al. (2009) for a detailed treatment. 12 only job ows were reported in earlier studies. Thus, if the estimates for the net and gross ows dier, it may be both due to the economic processes and/or due to country specicity in the sample composition. To address this point, we also provide estimates based on LiTS data, which are conceptually comparable to gross worker ows.
In Table 4 , we provide a variety of specications to account for the dierent measures of ows. First, in columns (1) to (3), we include the estimates for the raw values from the literature, separating the estimates for the gross worker ows and net job ows. However, these estimates can be excessively noisy due to the variation coming from the type of ows analyzed in the literature (e.g. only public sector or only manufacturing). Given that these distinctions might aect our result, as demonstrated by Table 3 , we control for them following a two-step procedure:
we regress our dependent variables of interest on the paper characteristics (without year or country dummies) and then we regress inequality and productivity measures on the residuals from the previous stage. Consequently, in the second set of specications, the explanatory variable is a residual from a specication that accounts for various properties of the data and measures. We display these results for the full set of available estimates in columns (4)-(5).
Finally, we provide conceptually comparable estimations where the measures of ows come from LiTS. We provide three specications from the LiTS data: for the same years and countries as in the literature columns (6) for (2) and (8) for (3) for the same countries as in the literature but all years columns (7) and (9), analogously; and for all the available countries and years in column (10). The intuition behind these three specications is to disentangle the dierences between the estimates obtained on the literature and the estimates obtained for the LiTS data into those that can be attributable to dierent sample structure and those that can be attributable to dierences in measures of ows
We nd a fairly weak and negative relationship between job destruction and productivity growth for the estimates from the literature. While the estimates are consistently negative, they lose signicance in the case of the indicators for the worker ows. Since the lack of signicance may come from the lower power due to lower number of observations, we turn to the estimates based on LiTS data for conrmation. In fact, comparable estimates from LiTS are also insignificant for the countries and years analyzed in the literature, so the lack of signicance is not a consequence of insucient power. However, for a longer time span as well as a wider selection of transition economies the link to productivity is negative and signicant column (10) of Table 4 . This result suggests that quantitatively the recession explanation dominates the Schumpeterian explanation, with a substantial country level heterogeneity. For job creation, the correlations with productivity are insignicant in the literature. However, when we rely on LiTS data, even for the same countries as in the literature, the results become signicant and positive columns (8) to (10) in Table 4 . This positive correlation even if not very robust further strengthens the interpretation that business cycle is the mitigating factor in between job creation and productivity growth in the transition economies.
For both job creation and job destruction we come to the mechanical explanation dominating the Schumpeterian notion of reallocation due to creative destruction. 15 While contemporaneous correlations may be insucient to demonstrate this link, we also try an alternative specication: 15 The results for other measures of labor market ows net reallocation, gross reallocation and excessive reallocation are reported in Table E .1 in Appendix. By and large they conrm these patterns. 13 instead of labor productivity growth year on year we use the chain index. We treat the last decade before the transition as basis (compute an average over these 10 years) and relate subsequent levels of labor productivity to this basis. The results are reported in Table E .2 in the Appendix.
The negative eect for the job destruction is fairly persistent, whereas the results for job creation are to a large extent driven by properties of the estimates, as they disappear once we control for study characteristics or include all countries and years.
Unlike labor productivity growth, the Gini index of income inequality displays a strong, robust and positive contemporaneous correlation with alternative measures of job ows. Regardless of the included controls and sample of countries, higher ows are associated with higher levels of inequality. One of the exceptions are the estimates which use only the indicators for the gross worker ows in the literature. However, the analogous estimations based on data from LiTS regain signicance and maintain a positive sign, which points to the low statistical power of estimates in column (3). Insignicant estimates for job creation in columns (4) and (5) i.e. the specications which include controls for the characteristics of the worker and sample may too be explained by lower statistical power. First, note that the size of the estimate in column (4) is fairly comparable to column (1) for the relation between job creation and inequality, but the standard errors are twice as large when additional controls are included. When country and year eects are additionally included (in column (5)) the size of the estimated coecient is substantially reduced, which could suggest a considerable role for country hereogeneity. To account for that, the estimates based on indicators computed on LiTS data include controls for country eects. Even in the case of smaller samples, the results are all positive and signicant columns (6) to (10) in Table 4 . sn olumns I to Q our min independent vriles re the rw estimtes of tg nd th from di'erent ppersF sn @IA we use ll )owsD in @PA we keep only only jo @netA )ows nd in @QA we keep worker @grossA )ows F sn olumns @RA nd @SAD our right hnd side vriles re the )ows one the pper hrteristis re tken into ountD s in le QF sn olumn @RA we use just the residulsD while in @SA we lso dd ountry nd yer ontrolsF sn olumn @TA to @IHA we repet the experiment from the (rst three olumns on the vi dtseF sn @TAD we look t )ows from the sme ountries nd yers thn worker )ows from the litertureF henD in @UA we restrit the smple to the ountries for whih we hd informtion on worker )ows from the litertureD ut we extend the time spn to over ll yersF golumns @VA nd @WA re nlogous to @TA nd @UAD with the di'erene tht we keep ountries for whih we hve informtion on net )owsD ut use ll the trnsition yers @iFeF etween IWVW nd PHHHAF sn @IHA we present the results for ll ountries nd yers with ville informtion from the viF footstrpped stndrd errors with IHHH repetitions in prenthesisF BBBDBBDB indite signi(ne t the S7D IH7 nd IS7 levelF esults for grossD net nd exess rellotion reported in eppendix iF
The positive correlations between both measures of job ows and income inequality seem to be a fairly universal phenomenon. Such results are indicative of two types of mechanisms: (i) low perhaps even insucient generosity of the social safety nets in transition countries; (ii) more dispersed income structures in newly created jobs. Possibly, relative to the old jobs, the newly created ones oered either substantially worse or substantially better working conditions in terms of remuneration, wage arrears, etc. A weak and negative correlation between job destruction and labor productivity growth suggest that the recessionary mechanism was stronger than the Schumpeterian creative destruction during the process of worker reallocation between jobs.
However, these contemporaneous correlations fail to describe causal relationships. In the next section we seek to establish long-term eects of labor market ows on aggregate indicators such as labor productivity and inequality.
The long-run eects
Given data constraints, providing trend estimations is not feasible. Nonetheless, we can relate the measures of labor market ows during the transition to subsequent changes in productivity and inequality. One possible approach is to rely on a lagged dependent variable model, but this is only possible at the expense of losing observations from early years of transition, as well as from some countries. Hence, we follow an alternative approach: we provide estimates for the lead observations of productivity growth and inequality (dependent variable) rather than lags of the ows (independent variable). The detailed estimates are reported in Table F .1 in the Appendix, whereas below we present the point estimates with the condence intervals.
In the reminder of this section we compare the estimates for two samples. We consider the mean estimate for either job destruction or job creation from the literature for each country and and consecutive values of the labor productivity growth, with the year on the horizontal axis denoting the number of years between a given ow and a labor productivity number in a regression.
In total, these are the results from 10 separate regressions, each of 67 observations. In Figure   2 we do the same for the job destructions (literature) or separations (LiTS).
17 These estimates conrm the lack of clear signicant pattern between the job creation in the literature and the rate of labor productivity growth. While these partial correlations are not precisely estimated, they remain around zero regardless of the time distance between the measured job ow and the productivity growth. Similarly, the positive link between productivity and hirings obtained from the LiTS data proves to be consistent and lasting.
The trends described above the lack of a clear link between job ows and productivity and the positive relation between worker ows and productivity might seem contradictory;
16 These values are reported in Table A .2 in the Appendix. 17 The alternative specications tested included median rather than mean estimate for a given country in a given year as well as the use the number of estimates for country-year pair as weights. The results remain unaected. Table F.1. however, one potential explanation is that the majority of worker ows were not associated with bankruptcies and start-ups, but rather restructuring and repositioning within the existing rms. As for the income inequality, the results of Table 4 were indicative of either of the two possible explanations: (i) insucient safety nets and (ii) higher wage dispersion in newly created jobs. We seek to distinguish between these two explanations by repeating the exercise for the leads of the Gini coecient. This is done in Figures 3 and 4 for job creation/hirings and job destruction/separations, respectively.
18 The positive correlations between inequality and worker ows seem to be rather short-term. By contrast, the impulse from job ows tend to re-emerge in subsequent years. Moreover, in both the job ows and the worker ows, the estimated coecients are positive for creation and destruction alike. Given the relatively persistently high 18 The clear pattern for inequality and the much weaker and partial pattern for productivity growth seem to have at least two explanations. First, worker ows comprise also within industry changes, for example separations and hirings as well as job destructions and creations within the contracting public sector. Thus, if new positions exhibit more wage dispersion e.g. due to skill biased technological change one should observe higher income inequality even if job ows are synchronized. The eects of net job ows and gross worker ows appear to work in the same direction. Second, many of the transition countries cushioned the labor market adjustments with early retirement schemes, see Fox (1997) . Such policies naturally mitigate the eect separations and job destructions on income inequality if pension benets are more generous than the unemployment benets. Also, such policies break the long-term link between job ows and inequality.
Conclusions
This paper aimed to test empirically if massive and rapid labor reallocation exhibits a link with productivity growth and income inequality. Such a causal link has been postulated by economic theory and is appealing as it is fairly intuitive. Moreover, the implications of such link are of general interest, as periods of intensive labor reallocation occur regularly in advanced and emerging economies alike. While the policy relevance of this question remains high, typically
contemporaneous data that can be used to address this problem is scarce.
We use the insights from rich, although diversied, literature on labor ows during the transition from a centrally planned to market economic system in Central and Eastern Europe.
Typically, economic transition from a centrally planned to a market economy produces winners and losers (i.e. inequality). It has been also believed that the change in the structure of output has followed the global competitive pressure towards comparative advantage and more productive sectors. In fact, while some of the transition economies have experienced a spectacular increase in labor productivity, they also witnessed a surge in income inequality. Admittedly, productivity growth becomes faster and inequality growth becomes slower with the time from the onset of the transition.
The exploratory analysis of over 450 estimates provided by the earlier studies reveals some interesting and still policy relevant patterns. First, against the conventional wisdom, large rms and public rms (typically state-owned or formerly state-owned) were characterized by net job destruction rates similar to small rms and private rms. It is rather the lower job creation rate in the public sector that dierentiates the two. Similar phenomena were described by Cahuc and Zylberberg (2009) in their analysis of sunrising and sunsetting branches of the French economy, with relevant policy implications. Our results lend the support to these conclusions in the context of a massive labor reallocation rather than gradual structural adjustment. Moreover, this channel of adjustment seems to be particularly relevant for massive reallocations, because neither the estimates from the literature nor the cross-validation from LiTS data conrm the strong link between job ows and labor productivity growth. In fact, we nd little support to the claim that job creation and productivity exhibit any long-run relationship. In the short-run, the link between productivity and reallocation is weak and mostly driven by job destructions.
This relation seems to be closer to the standard mechanics of the recessionary pressure than to the Schumpeterian notion of creative destruction.
On the other hand, the link between job ows and inequality is strong, positive and robust to the country and period selection. Yet, it is rather a short-term phenomenon, which points to the relevance of wage dispersion in the process of massive labor reallocation. While we do not analyze social safety nets explicitly, the revealed patterns concerning inequality suggest that social safety nets especially income support for elderly permanent labor market quitters helped to mitigate the perils of transition. Indeed, the long run eects are small. The direct eects of massive labor reallocation on the wage dispersion with the special emphasis on the newly created jobs remain to be explicitly analyzed in the future studies.
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Online appendices A Summary of the available estimates IWVU  I  I  P   IWVV  I  I  P   IWVW  IV  I  I  PH   IWWH  I  IV  I PH  I  S  I  RU   IWWI  I  IV  I  I  T  T  QQ   IWWP  I  IW  I  I  IV  I  I  RP   IWWQ  T  IW  T  T  P  I  P  RP   IWWR II I  PQ  PW  T  IR  P  IHR   IWWS  I  I  Q  I  II  T  S  P  QI   IWWT  I  I  P  P  I  QP  R  Q  RT   IWWU  I  I  P  P  I  T  R  Q  PH   IWWV  I  I  I  T  Q  IH  PP   IWWW  I  I  R  P  IH  IV   PHHH  I  W  I  II   PHHI  I  I  P   PHHP  I  I   PHHQ  I  I   PHHR  I  I otl PQ S IPT W SW PP IHS IP RP QQ RSR Note: he numer of estimtes from eh ountry nd yer my ome from more thn one pperF Table 3 to additional measures of job reallocation: gross reallocation, net reallocation and excess reallocation. First three columns correspond to measures of ows based on worker level data (gross ows) and measures of ows based on rm data (net ows). Bootstrapped (1000 repetitions) standard errors presented in parentheses. ***,**,* denote signicance at the 5%,10% and 15% condence level respectively.
C Sources of data for productivity and inequality
As with many other variables, the measurement of productivity and productivity changes in transition countries suers from information shortages. To the best of our knowledge, the Conference Board provides the most comprehensive database on productivity in transition economies. In addition to the data on nominal and real GDP, the database includes less frequently available variables, such as total number of employees. Conference Board data has also total hours worked, Given that all countries analyzed in the literature diered in productivity already at the beginning of transition, we constructed a chain index of per worker productivity, which takes the countries' average productivity during the 1980's as a reference level, see left panel of Figure C .1.
The patterns described at length in earlier studies exhibit an important dip at the beginning of the period followed by a recovery, which was faster in Baltic and Central European Countries than in other former Soviet Union countries. Notably, most of those countries had still in 2000 (and some even in 2010) productivity levels below the 1980's average. Theil coecient, percentiles ratios, etc). We report in detail the sources in Alexeev and Gaddy (1993 ) for 1990 and Milanovic and Ying (1996 for 1992. For Ukraine, we complemented the Transmonee data with the results from Kakwani (1996 ) for 1990 -1991 and Deininger and Squire (1996 for 1996. Finally, in the case of Russia, we used estimates from the country statistical oce and the World Development Indicators. All these indicators refer to inequality in disposable income measured at household level.
For most transition economies analyzed in the literature, inequality uctuated, but the extent of change as well as adjustment paths diered. In the case of Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia, increments during the period were negligible and can well be the reection of measurement errors. Ukraine, Russia, Estonia, Bulgaria and Poland experienced an initial stark increase in income inequality, which peaked in mid-1990s and stabilized or even decreased since. Romania also experienced an increase around that period, but maintained a high level of inequality afterwards. Indeed, only in some countries (Russia, Ukraine and to a lesser extent Estonia) the Gini index varied considerably. In the remaining, the coecient of variation (standard deviation to mean ratio) amounted to less than 0.1. EBRD (2006) , Sanfey and Teksoz (2006) . LiTS rely on worker self-reported information on consecutive jobs held, i.e. it allows to compute hirings and separations rather than job creation and job destruction. As reporeted already in Table 3 , it is the latter that are more frequently reported in the literature. In order to allow wider country and period coverage, we compare the estimates from LiTS to estimates from the literature for job creation and job destruction, i.e. 53 country-year observations. 19 . When more than one estimate per country-year is available, we take the mean of them as the reference point. The choice of the mean as a reference point has little impact on conclusions we have tested the specication for median of the available estimates as well as tted values from Table   3 . The results are reported in in Figure D .1 and in In most cases, worker level ows are larger than rm level ows, which conrms the results from The estimates for the 12 data points for countries and years where the literature reports hirings and rings are available upon request. 20 For example, Estonia in 1991 had job destructions close to 16 % of the workforce (more than two standard deviations away from the mean in the sample). 
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